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1. Introduction 
It is notable when philosophers in one tradition take seriously the work in another and 
engage with it. This is certainly the case when Paul Ricoeur engages with the thought of 
Derek Parﬁt on personal identity. He sees it as worth engaging with, but as emblematic of 
errors in the analytic approach to the topic, especially when it comes to methodology. But he 
is, in a fairly clear way, taking the analytic debate on its own terms. Marya Schechtman’s work 
is also noteworthy in this regard. Although she writes in the analytic tradition, in many ways 
she has represented thinking like Ricoeur’s in the tradition – pressing concerns that echo his, 
and demanding that the debate needs to take notice. I will focus on complaints that both 
of them present,  which I  think are closely related, about  the thought experiments that 
feature large in analytic discussions of personal identity, especially in the seminal work of 
Parﬁt. The complaints relate both to those devices and to the theory they have produced. I 
want to offer something of a defence of both. 
 
2. The Psychological View of Personal Identity 
Before considering their criticism, I want to outline brieﬂy the Psychological Continuity 
Theory of personal identity (PCT) which Ricoeur and Schechtman consider, and how thought 
experiments are supposed to relate to it. The theory  in  general  holds  that person X at time t 
is identical to person Y at an earlier time t – n if and only if X is uniquely psychologically 
continuous with Y. Parﬁt describes the details as follows. 
 
Psychological continuity is the holding of overlapping chains of strong connectedness … For X 
and Y to be the same person, there must be over every day enough direct psychological 
connections. (Parﬁt 1984, 206) 
 
The connections he has in mind are links of memory (or, rather, apparent memory), 
continuing dispositional attitudes like desires and beliefs, projects, emotional attachments, 
character dispositions and so on. Parﬁt does not mention unconscious connections, but 
those should be included among the links which make up the continuity. There need be 
no such direct links over a whole life, they may only be short-term, but it is the continuity 
that overlapping links provide that constitutes a person’s persistence. 
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Although not all versions of the PCT do so, the theory is well-placed to forefront our agency. 
It focuses on psychological connections, and among those are the ones, especially 
sophisticated ones like intentions and higher-order beliefs and desires, that most obviously 
facilitate agency. By highlighting these attitudes, it is in position to provide an account of the 
persistence of things which are capable of agency and which are appropriate as the subjects of 
judgements of responsibility and attitudes of self-concern. Psychological views differ on how 
close the link between moral identity and personal identity should be. Schechtman takes all 
versions of the PCT to adopt a “coincidence model”, whereby the limits of a person 
coincide with the limits of relevant practical judgments – X is the person who did A iff X is 
responsible for A, and so on (Schechtman, 2014, p. 41). Parﬁt does indeed seem to opt for this 
model, although his claims in this regard are often tenuously expressed. My version (Beck, 
2013a, 2013b) accepts that practical matters are related to issues of identity, but not as directly 
as this. You must be the sort of thing that is an agent and can have moral identity, but personal 
identity is not the same matter. There may well be actions which are yours but for which you 
are not responsible, just as there may be mental states of yours to which you have no 
conscious access. We will return to this issue in due course. 
 
We can begin to see already how the PCT contrasts with the narrative view of identity that 
Schechtman and Ricoeur share.1 Roughly, the narrative view is that to be the same person 
is to have a particular self-understanding or “sense of self”. This sense of self involves 
seeing experiences and actions as part of an intelligible whole. Sometimes this is expressed 
as having the capacity to tell a coherent story about ourselves – thus the label of 
“narrative”. Actions and experiences are yours in so far as they ﬁt meaningfully into your life 
story. This is the glue that holds a person together, rather than the causal links to which the 
PCT appeals. To the PCT, a sense of self – while required for being something appropriate 
as the subject of judgements of responsibility and self-concern – is just a connection, or is 
composed of a set of connections, among many others. Further differences will emerge as 
we go on. First, though, it would help to see how the thought experiments are supposed to 
relate to the PCT. 
 
3. Some Thought Experiments and the PCT 
Three well-known thought experiments will be the focus of my discussion, all of which 
feature extensively in the relevant sections of Ricoeur and Schechtman. 
 
(a) Transplants 
Transplant thought experiments begin with Locke’s case of the prince and the cobbler in the 
second edition of his Essay. 
 
For should the Soul of a Prince, carrying with it the consciousness of the Prince’s past Life, 
enter and inform the Body of a Cobler, as soon as deserted by his own Soul, every one sees, he 
would be the same Person with the Prince, accountable only for the Prince’s Actions: But who 
would say it was the same Man? (Locke, 1975, p. 340) 
                                                          
1 In the past, Schechtman’s view was an overtly narrative one (1996, 2005). Her current Person-Life View (2010, 2014) still has strong 
narrative elements, but is less straightforwardly a narrative theory. 
http://repository.uwc.ac.za
3 
 
 
Later versions also involve the ostensible transplant of one person into the body of 
another, but using mechanisms different from Locke’s soul-swap. Bernard Williams and 
Sydney Shoemaker (Williams, 1970; Shoemaker, 1984) envisage a brain-state-transfer 
device which would scan all the information in one brain, clear another of its information and 
enter the stored information into the cleared brain. A different version is presented by Eric 
Olson (1997, p. 52) and a more detailed version of it by Schechtman (2014, pp. 151– 52), which 
involves the transplant of a cerebrum from one person into the “decerebrated” body of 
another. Although Parﬁt makes no explicit use of such cases in support of his theory, they 
are usually taken to support the PCT by damaging certain of its rivals – views that hold 
personal identity to be a matter of physical or organism continuity. If everyone sees that 
the person in the cobbler body is now the prince, then having the same body cannot be a 
requirement for being the same person. 
 
(b) Teletransportation 
The Teletransporter is a machine which scans the exact state of every cell in someone’s 
body, destroys the original body and sends the scanned information to a distant Replicator 
where an exact copy is created out of new matter. Parﬁt starts his discussion in Reasons and 
Persons with a fairly detailed description of such an example (Parﬁt, 1984, p. 199), 
presenting it as a possible form of long-distance travel. The precise role of the thought 
experiment is not clear: it seems to be offered more as an illustration of his view, as no 
argument is explicitly based on it and the description is clearly question-begging. He 
describes the person emerging from the Replicator on Mars as  being  himself,  the person 
who entered the Teletransporter. While this is what the PCT implies about the case, he 
presents no demand at this stage that you should agree. In fact, he goes on to outline a 
development of the story: the Branch-Line Case, which on the face of things threatens the 
PCT. In this version, his original body is not destroyed, just damaged in such a way that it 
will die in a few days’ time. A replica is still created on Mars, however. Intuitively, this 
will now be just that – a replica and not the original Parﬁt, who is still alive on Earth but 
will soon die. The psychological criterion does not distinguish between the two, however. 
And because there are two, it counter-intuitively implies that neither is Parﬁt, not even 
the dying Earthling. Parﬁt’s promise is that he will go on to explain why we should not 
follow our intuitions in this regard and reject the PCT, but that we should change our 
intuitive views instead (Parﬁt, 1984, p. 201). 
 
(c) Reduplication, or My Division 
Perhaps the most important thought experiment in Parﬁt’s discussion is the one in which he 
envisages himself splitting into two (Parﬁt, 1984, pp. 245–73; 1995, pp. 41–44). We are asked 
to imagine a situation in which he is one of an identical triplet. In a strange accident, his body 
is fatally damaged, but his brain is untouched while the brains of both of his brothers are 
destroyed even though their bodies are otherwise undamaged. The Parﬁt in the example is 
such that, like some stroke patients, one hemisphere of his brain is capable of fully 
performing the functions of both hemispheres. Slightly more unusually, each of his 
hemispheres has this capacity. After the accident, his hemispheres are divided and 
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transplanted, one into each of his brothers’ bodies. The result  is  two people, physically very 
like him and both psychologically continuous with him. 
 
The case is presented as a challenge to non-reductionist accounts of personal identity, which 
Parﬁt sees as the common sense view of identity. These take personal identity to be a matter of 
fact over and above physical or psychological continuity, and for them says Parﬁt, “identity 
is always what matters”. The most important question is always, “Will that still be me?” 
However, in the case of My Division, there is no satisfactory answer to that question. We 
cannot say that both of the survivors are Parﬁt, because there are two of them and that 
conﬂicts with the necessity of identity. We cannot say he is the one rather than the other, 
because that would make identity arbitrary – neither has any claim to identity which the 
other does not have. And we cannot say he is neither, because if only one survives, that 
would be him. In this double case, then, we would be calling a double success a failure. 
What we have then is a reductio of the assumption that identity is always what matters: we 
have everything that matters in survival in both cases, but we cannot call it identity because 
identity demands uniqueness. Parﬁt suggests we must give up non-reductionism and the 
obsession with identity, and focus on issues of survival. In that case, we have two survival-
descendants of Parﬁt. And he can now argue that the Branch-Line case does not threaten the 
PCT: the relationship between the dying Earthling and the Mars Replica, although not 
identity, is more like normal survival than death. 
 
Although neither Schechtman nor Ricoeur are among the non-reductionists that Parﬁt has in 
mind, it is well worth noting that both of them share the non-reductionist belief that personal 
identity involves an irreducible phenomenological connection in the sense of self. This will be a 
central point of contention. 
 
4. Schechtman’s Objections and Some Defences 
Unlike Ricoeur, who rejects all of the thought experiments outlined, Schechtman has a 
more measured attitude towards them. “I have some reservations about the use of fantastic 
thought experiments”, she writes, a central one being “that it is not clear if we are truly able to 
imagine what we think we are imagining” (Schechtman, 2014, p. 154). Despite these 
reservations, she does not reject the method, but warns that “we must be careful both to 
spell out the cases on which we reﬂect in sufﬁcient detail to allow us to make relatively 
informed decisions about what they tell us and to be modest in our conclusions” (2014, p. 
154). 
 
Schechtman thinks that thought experiments can be informative; it will nevertheless be worth 
looking at her reservations. However, ﬁrst we need to consider another case she makes 
against the PCT in which they feature centrally. She contends that transplant arguments 
commit the PCT to accepting phenomenological connections as fundamental to identity 
conditions – a commitment that psychological theorists explicitly reject. 
 
Locke argues for a psychological approach by asking us to reﬂect on hypothetical cases like 
that of the prince whose consciousness enters the body of a cobbler. In this case, he says, we 
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will judge that the person goes where the consciousness goes. Anticipating such a switch the 
prince would anticipate having future experience in the cobbler’s body rather than in the one 
he now inhabits. It is the pains and pleasures of the cobbler body rather than the princely one 
that he will feel after the transfer takes place. It is this phenomenological connection to future 
experience that makes for personal identity on Locke’s view. Psychological theorists use 
Lockean thought experiments to argue for a psychological approach and to this extent are 
obligated to include those features of Locke’s account that follow from it. My claim is that 
they fail to do this. Overlapping chains of strong psychological connectedness do not in 
themselves guarantee a phenomenological connection between persons at two different 
times, only a certain kind of likeness or continuity in the contents of consciousness. 
(Schechtman, 2013, pp. 47–48) 
 
According to the PCT, while a continuing sense of self is important, the connections which form 
it are not required for a person to retain their identity. As long as there is continuity made up 
of overlapping connections like these ones, there can be identity. It is that which allows the 
theory to avoid the incoherence of which Locke was accused by Reid and to meet the 
intuition that you can survive massive psychological changes over time. If body-swap 
thought experiments were to commit the theory to a phenomenological connection, the 
danger of incoherence would be right back. Her narrative theory embraces 
phenomenological connections: those experiences and actions you understand to be 
yours as they ﬁt in to your life story are, by that inclusion, yours.2 This explains how you 
are responsible for them, something Locke demands and which  the  narrative theory can 
provide. 
 
There is no need for concern, however, even for those who think that the psychological view 
gets its only support from these thought experiments. That is because a reliance on 
something like a phenomenological connection in this one argument does not commit the 
theory to its being fundamental in identity conditions. Something like a phenomenological 
connection does seem to be at work in Locke’s thought experiment: he is relying on the 
prince anticipating the experiences in the cobbler-body to be his, just as the person in the 
cobbler body will remember the prince’s past life as his. This is part of what he thinks 
will bring everyone to see that it is the prince in the cobbler-body. But why would 
relying on these features entrench phenomenological connections in the PCT? The PCT 
acknowledges a sense of self and can include it in its account, although not as necessary in 
every case of identity between persons. That seems to entitle the PCT to appeal to related 
features in a thought experiment, but it does not follow that this commits it to 
phenomenological connections. 
 
The thought experiment works as a refuter of a general principle, the principle that it is 
necessary to be the same organism in order to be the same person. It presents a single case in 
which someone is intuitively clearly the same person – perhaps using a sense of self to make 
the case as clear as possible – in which we have a different organism but the same person. At 
                                                          
2 That is, the narrative theory that she was defending at the time. Her new Person-Life View, although not a straightforward narrative 
theory, also commits to phenomenological connections, as we shall see. 
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most that requires the sense of self to be a sufﬁcient condition for identity; it comes nowhere 
close to making it necessary even if Locke might be guilty of implying this.3 Insofar as 
thought experiments are like empirical experiments we should never expect more than this 
and sensible proponents of the PCT will not. As Schechtman indicated but uncharitably 
doubts of the psychological theorist, we must be modest in our conclusions. The role of the 
case is to undermine opponents who insist that identity of body or organism is required for 
personal identity, thereby offering only indirect support to the PCT. 
 
I mentioned that she has other reservations regarding thought experiments. Although she 
thinks body-swap or “transplant” cases can be informative, she writes: 
 
It might be, for instance, that unforeseen pressures or developments would make it 
impossible to really treat transplant products of the sort described as if they were the original 
person. If that were the case, … (we would have to) conclude that even though we might 
predict that a person could survive such a transplant it turns out that they actually cannot. 
(Schechtman, 2014, p. 154) 
 
This is what she has in mind when she demands “sufﬁcient detail” and suggests that we are not 
always imagining what we think we are imagining in a thought experiment. She says these 
are common charges against thought experiments. However, on the face of things, there is 
something odd about them. It is clear how the charge is meant to work: the scenario you are 
claiming to imagine does not meet the description offered and which would make it an 
appropriate counter-example. In our case, you say you are imagining a prince’s consciousness 
going in to the body of a cobbler (and are inclined to say that body now contains the 
prince), but what you actually imagine does not amount to that and so you have no 
counter-example to the animalist (or other) thesis. But how could it be that you are not 
imagining what you think you are imagining? If you are the author of the story, then you 
have just that – authority. And even if you are imagining a ﬁction authored by someone 
else, these days we understand readers as co-authors, so the situation is not that much 
different: if you think that you are imagining a prince’s consciousness going into a cobbler’s 
body, then you are doing just that. After all, it is your conceptual scheme that we are 
investigating and if the story makes sense there, that is enough. 
 
How then could it be the case that what you are imagining is not what you think you are 
imagining – that it is not a body swap but something else or some facsimile you are conjuring 
up? One aspect of the charge seems to be that in order to properly imagine a body-swap, you 
would have to include a number of important details that are omitted in the description of 
the case and which might well affect your response to it, or make it impossible to respond. In 
Real People (1988, p. 11), Kathleen Wilkes distinguished between imagining how something 
occurs and imagining that it occurs. This understanding of the charge is that you fail to 
                                                          
3 Schechtman thinks his talk of “the same consciousness” is a commitment to a phenomenological connection – a person’s 
consciousness is not the same one in virtue of being made up of a particular set of memory and other connections, it just is the same one. 
But this would open him up to the very objections that he presses against immaterial substance as being that which provides for a 
person’s persistence. 
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imagine that a swap has occurred. Wilkes wrote that in the context of imagining that a 
person divides into two, we would need to have answers to the following sort of questions. 
 
How often? Is it predictable? Or sometimes predictable and sometimes not, like dying? Can it 
be prevented? Just as obviously, the background society against which we set the 
phenomenon is now mysterious. Does it have such institutions as marriage? How could 
that work? Or universities? It would be difﬁcult, to say the least, if universities doubled in 
size every few days, or weeks, or years. Are pregnant women debarred from splitting? The 
entire background here is incomprehensible. When we ask what we would say if this 
happened, who, now, are ‘we’? (Wilkes, 1988, p. 11) 
 
With a few relevant changes, the same questions could be demanded of someone claiming to 
imagine that a person swaps bodies. Schechtman indicates a shared concern with Wilkes 
when she talks of “pressures or developments (that) would make it impossible to really 
treat transplant products of the sort described as if they were the original person” (2014, 
p. 154). In The Constitution of Selves she wrote, 
 
Insofar as we can imagine such a world at all, we must imagine it as very different from our 
own. Those in it would be left without any quick and reliable means of determining who they 
were dealing with, and it would be incredibly difﬁcult – if possible at all – to maintain the 
kinds of social organizations that deﬁne our own culture. (Schechtman, 1996, p. 134) 
 
The suggestion is that we have not imagined the phenomenon in question until all these 
details are ﬁlled in and if they were ﬁlled in, our concepts would no longer apply. 
 
The questions are interesting ones, but involve great exaggeration and it is very hard to see 
how they are crucial to imagining that a body-swap or split has occurred. Why would you 
have to know how the imagined society coped with a body-swap (let alone with vast numbers 
of body-swaps) in order to make a judgement from your current perspective on who the 
person in the cobbler-body is? Applying your concepts to a situation does not require you 
to have learned to live with that situation, nor does it require you to believe that the people 
in the situation would agree with your judgements. Wilkes’ “we” seems to refer to the people 
in the imagined situation. They may well face all kinds of practical difﬁculties in coping with 
its consequences, but those are not our problems – we are just who we are, the people 
considering the scenario with our current conceptual schemes.4 A ready response suggests 
that our concepts do indeed apply – as Schechtman says, we predict that the person 
whose psychology is transferred will survive. If they are not treated as a transplanted 
person, that should surely raise a moral issue for us, but it is not clear that it raises a 
metaphysical one. Schechtman wrote in her earlier book, 
 
The very concept of personhood involves a social dimension – to be a person is to be able to 
engage with others in particular ways. (1996, p. 133) 
                                                          
4 I present a more detailed response to the difficulties Schechtman and Wilkes present in Beck (2014). 
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The argument here is that we may not realize how the counterfactual phenomenon being 
proposed may interfere with the engagements that are constitutive of the concept, and 
these details need to be thought through before any response to a scenario could count. 
While her claim in the quote is correct, however, it should not lead us anywhere near the 
conclusion that a thought experiment like Locke’s cannot play its envisaged role. She 
illustrates her thinking in her discussion of ﬁssion cases in Staying Alive (2014, pp. 159–66). 
Parﬁt has argued that the  intrinsic relationship between  each survivor of ﬁssion contains 
all that matters in survival, and so here we have a double success rather than a failure. But 
Schechtman responds that we should not see things so simply. 
 
Parﬁt’s argument assumes that the only attributes that can matter to survival are intrinsic. At 
best the intrinsic features of the two ﬁssion products are each identical to the intrinsic 
features a unique survivor would have in the case where only one of the ﬁssion products 
survives. The relation of each survivor to his environment and other people is, however, 
drastically different from the relation a unique survivor would have to his environment 
and to other people. If fundamental person-speciﬁc relational properties are taken into 
account the relation of the ﬁssion products to the original person is not the same as the 
relation of the unique survivor. (2014, pp. 161–62) 
 
Because we do not split like amoebas our entire cultural and social infrastructure – the 
infrastructure that supports personhood – is built around the unity of the loci with which 
we interact. If we encountered a single instance of doubling we undoubtedly would not 
know how to react, and if it became common we would become different sorts of beings with 
an entirely different (and to me not-yet-imaginable) social organization and another way 
of life … Such beings might come to be, but they will probably not be persons. (2014, p. 164) 
 
We can grant Schechtman that our usual social interactions would be upset in a society of 
splitters. But the move from a single case of splitting, to a whole society of splitters, to 
ﬁssion products not being persons is much too swift. Especially if it is meant to provide a 
reason for not taking thought experiments seriously, and the charge that we are not 
imagining what we think we are. The original thought experiment only requires one split to do 
its task. True, the social aspect is not taken very seriously by Parﬁt. But we can ﬁll that in, 
suggesting how two person-lives continue, difﬁcult though coping may be for the nearest and 
dearest of the splitter. We will still be talking about what are recognisably persons, even if 
we cannot talk of “the locus of concern”. That does not mean there are none, and the 
original problem can still be raised: the details simply go to making the scenario more easily 
imaginable. The points Wilkes and Schechtman make do not show how thought 
experiments cannot play the role of causing damage to the strong claims that theories 
opposed to the Psychological View make. There are other aspects to Schechtman’s concern 
about thought experiments, however, and these will emerge as we discuss Ricoeur’s 
objections. 
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5. Ricoeur’s Objections: The Root of Inconceivability 
Perhaps Ricoeur’s discussion can provide the missing ingredients to make sense of the 
charge that we are not imagining what we think we are. Many of his comments echo 
aspects of Schechtman’s, but they go further as well. His central charge is that all of the 
envisaged ﬁctions violate what he calls the “terrestrial” or “corporeal” condition. 
 
Insofar as the body as one’s own is a dimension of oneself, … imaginative variations around 
the corporeal condition are variations on the self and its selfhood. Furthermore, in virtue of 
the mediating function of the body as one’s own in the structure of being in the world, the 
feature of selfhood belonging to corporeality is extended to that of the world as it is inhabited 
corporeally. (Ricoeur, 1992, p. 150) 
 
Part of my selfhood is knowing my body as my own,5 and how I experience the world 
through it. This makes the scenarios of the thought experiments inconceivable. In the case 
of teletransportation: 
 
Are we capable of conceiving of … variations such that the corporeal and terrestrial condition 
itself becomes a mere variable, a contingent variable, if the teletransported individual does 
not transport with himself some residual traits of this condition, without which he could 
no longer be said to act or to suffer, even if it were only the question of knowing if and 
how he is going to survive? (Ricoeur, 1992, pp. 150–51) 
 
This needs some spelling out, but seems to contain a crucial argument. His thinking goes 
along the following lines. Morality requires that I know that certain past and future 
experiences were and will be mine. To be an agent (and a sufferer), I must be able to be 
properly held responsible and to be counted upon to keep my promises (and so on), and 
that requires that I must know that the relevant experience or behaviour was mine. This 
includes knowledge that the bodily activity was, or will be, mine, in line with my 
characteristic, habitual behaviour, the behaviour by which I am recognized (Ricoeur, 1992, 
p. 148). But this required knowledge is missing in the thought experiments: they are all in 
principle undecidable.  The last  sentence of  the quote points  to  this – the  aspirant 
teletransportee cannot know if he will survive. Because the knowledge required for the 
possibility of agency is missing, the question of whether or not this is the same person – in 
the serious sense of continuing selfhood – cannot even arise. You cannot coherently conceive 
of selfhood under these conditions. The most that makes sense are questions of sameness – 
of how similar the person is. And that is decidedly not the issue. 
 
The trick that the thought experimenters use to make their ﬁctions appear conceivable is to 
substitute the brain for the whole person, and then to manipulate the brain to achieve the 
apparent scenario in which a fundamental requirement is undermined – where an 
“existential invariant becomes a variable” (p. 150). “Dream technology” is appealed to 
                                                          
5 Those parts of it, unlike my brain, that I experience: “In truth, the expression ‘my brain’ has no meaning, at least not directly” 
(Ricoeur, 1992, p. 132). 
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which, when applied to a brain achieves the results of transplantation, reduplication or 
teletransportation of persons – but these are not persons at all. By substituting brains for 
persons, the situation becomes “impersonal”. “The question of selfhood”, he says, “has 
been eliminated as a matter of principle” (1992, p. 135). This is why Ricoeur labels them 
technological ﬁctions, and why we can learn nothing about personal identity from them. On 
the other hand, literary ﬁctions deal with persons, beings with selfhood, in that they 
respect the corporeal and terrestrial condition.6  
 
Literary ﬁctions differ fundamentally from technological ﬁctions in that they remain 
imaginative variations on an invariant, our corporeal condition experienced as the 
existential mediation between the self and the world. (Ricoeur, 1992, p. 150) 
 
Flouting the corporeal condition in their thought experiments is a symptom of a general 
malaise in the reductionist camp, according to Ricoeur. They confuse issues of sameness and 
issues of selfhood (and replace the latter with the former). Selfhood involves not only 
sameness but also the notion that occurred in the account of agency above – that our 
experiences and bodies have, as part of their factual character, a “phenomenon of mine-
ness” (1992, p. 132). “It is not the sameness of my body that consititutes its selfhood, but its 
belonging to someone capable of designating himself or herself as the one whose body it is” 
(1992, p. 129); “the body as one’s own is a dimension of oneself” (1992, p. 150). The reductionist 
attempts to set up the debate about personal identity in terms of neutral events, thereby 
leaving their ownership out and begging the question against non-reductionists. This is just 
what they continue to do in their thought experiments and why those are phenomenologically  
inconceivable. 
 
6. Why That Does Not Establish Inconceivability 
Let me start my response to the charge of this version of the claim that we are not imagining 
what we think we are imagining by considering teletransportation. Ricoeur’s description is as 
follows: 
 
an exact copy is made of my brain. This copy is transmitted by radio to a receiver placed on 
another planet, where a replicator reconstitutes an exact replica of me on the basis of this 
information, identical in the sense of exactly similar as to the organization and sequence of 
states of affairs and events … [M]y brain and my body are destroyed during my space 
voyage. The question is whether I survived in my replica or whether I died. (Ricoeur, 
1992, p. 134) 
 
He presents this as an illustration of a brain being substituted for the person and then 
manipulated. However, that is a misleading version of Parﬁt’s scenario.7 Parﬁt’s scenario 
does not focus on the brain, but outlines how the information on the condition of every cell 
                                                          
6 Whether literary fictions always respect the corporeal condition and whether this distinction is a useful one are questions I raise in 
Beck (2006). 
7 In more ways than the one I am about to explain. For instance, Parfit’s version has the original cells destroyed as their states are 
recorded, not later, during the transmission. There is no duplication in his first description. 
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in my body is transmitted and then replicated – the entire body, even down to the cut on the 
lip from this morning’s shave (Parﬁt, 1984, p. 199). How is this then a case of the brain 
substituting for the person? And in what sense has the personal been elided? The individual 
who wakes up on Mars will have a sense of self, just as the aspirant traveller did: they will 
have a sense of being that self. They will have memories of experiences on Earth that will 
bear the feature of mineness: “the feeling of belonging … to someone capable of describing 
himself or herself as their owner” (Ricoeur, 1992, p. 136). They will be embedded in an 
easily recognizable social network, as they are in Parﬁt’s description. Everything that Ricoeur 
has suggested to be required for selfhood seems to be in place. 
 
But perhaps this is not all that important. The central argument for inconceivability did not 
depend on the substitution of brain for person, it was based on the undecidability of identity 
questions in the scenarios. And this one is undecidable, says Ricoeur (1992, pp. 134–35). But 
is it undecidable? Parﬁt does not think so (just as Locke – as Ricoeur points out – did not 
think the prince and the cobbler was undecidable). People’s intuitive responses differ as to 
whether or not you survive the Teletransporter, but they do not think there is not an answer. 
Ricoeur cannot be dismissing these responses on the grounds of the inconceivability of the 
case – inconceivability cannot be the reason for undecidability – because his argument goes 
the other way: undecidability takes away agency and selfhood. To appeal to inconceivability 
here would be to beg the question: it is inconceivable (supposedly) because you cannot know 
whether you will survive, so it cannot be that you don’t know that because the situation is 
somehow inconceivable. 
 
Ricoeur does have more to say, however, in pointing to the undecidability of 
teletransportation. He glosses his claim, 
 
with respect to numerical identity, my replica is other than I; with respect to qualitative 
identity, it is indistinguishable from me, hence substitutable. (Ricoeur, 1992, p. 135) 
 
But this does not amount to undecidability. Many perfectly decidable cases are cases of 
qualitative, but not numerical, identity. The question is, why is it not numerical identity? 
What is it that makes my replica (by which he means the individual who emerges from the 
Replicator) not me? He needs a reason independent of his theory, or clear intuitive 
agreement, otherwise the suspicion of a begged question remains. Perhaps this is to be 
too demanding – maybe it is enough that against the background of his own theory the 
issue is undecidable. But even there, this is not clearly the case: as  I have argued above, 
everything he says that is required for selfhood seems to be in place. Why then can you not 
know (as Parﬁt’s teletransportee is presented as knowing) that you will survive? 
 
He has one more direct comment on the subject, in a footnote: 
 
One may well, however, object to the very construction of the imaginary case that, if the 
replica of my brain were a complete replica, it would have to contain, in addition to the 
traces of my past history, the mark of my history to come woven out of chance encounters. 
http://repository.uwc.ac.za
12 
 
 
But this condition would indeed appear to violate the rules of what is conceivable: from the 
time of the separation of myself and my replica, our histories distinguish us and make us 
unsubstitutable. The very notion of replica is in danger of losing all meaning. (Ricoeur, 
1992, p. 136 n24) 
 
But this does not really provide a satisfactory answer. If it turns simply on the word 
“replica” implying that there is a non-identical original, then other terms could be used 
which do not. Parﬁt’s usage is to make the point that the matter composing the body is not 
the same matter as that on Earth – the usual bodily continuity that we have is being 
disrupted. But this does not disrupt the features that Ricoeur suggests it does – the newly 
constituted body will have not only traces of my past history, but also “the mark of my 
history to come woven out of chance encounters”. Ricoeur insists that myself and my 
replica have separate existences, but that is clear only in his description: my body is 
destroyed during the transmission of the information and thus exists alongside the replica-to-
be for a while. On Parﬁt’s account, my body is destroyed as the information about it is stored: 
there is no reduplication in simple teletransportation, and thus no obvious “separation”. 
 
In the Branch-Line Case, there is separation. It may well be that he is looking ahead to the 
Branch-Line Case when he makes his point about numerical identity. However, that does 
not by itself imply anything for the decidability of the Simple Case. Nor does it actually make 
the Branch-Line Case undecidable. In the Branch-Line Case, Ricoeur’s talk of the 
phenomenon of mineness has a ﬁrm hold: the dying Earthling’s experiences and body 
have a relation to me that the Mars person’s do not have, even though those are very 
similar. Because of this, the Mars person is a replica in Ricoeur’s sense – numerically non-
identical. Parﬁt suggests that things should not be seen in these terms and that the relation 
between the dying Earthling and the Mars person is much like normal survival. However, 
the counter-intuition is very strong, as Schechtman is quick to point out in her discussion 
of the case, and it turns on the points that Ricoeur raises here. Nevertheless, the reductionist 
PCT does not have to go with Parﬁt on this. After all, there is no continuity between the 
dying Earthling and the Mars person, in the sense that a cut on the lip of the former will 
neither cause a cut nor a pain in the latter. It can accept that there are two distinct persons 
here, both fully formed selves with a shared past. To meet the counterintuition and retain its 
consistency, it only needs to acknowledge that while psychological continuity is always 
necessary for identity, it may not always be sufﬁcient.8 It does not need to accept the 
irreducibility of personal identity. 
 
It might be worth a return to Schechtman at this point, and the issues she raises related to the 
inadequacy of reductionism when it comes to the Branch-Line Case. It may help to make 
Ricoeur’s worries clearer, although I will suggest that it gets no further in making a case 
against the Psychological View. 
 
                                                          
8 More needs to be said about what would make its criterion of identity sufficient. I make a suggestion in Beck (2015). There are other 
ways available as well, such as Daniel Kolak’s arguments that fission does not destroy identity (Kolak, 2008). 
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Schechtman points out that, although there is psychological continuity and connectedness 
between the dying Earthling who emerges from the Transmitter and the person on Mars 
and thus enough to count as survival on the Psychological View, this will not seem like 
survival to the dying Earthling. 
 
This suggests that there is a deep connection between the person who steps into the 
Teletransportation booth on Earth and the dying Earthling that does not exist between that 
person and the replica on Mars, and that absent this deeper connection there does not seem 
to be a basis for the person on Earth to feel egoistic concern for the future of the replica, 
nor for the replica to be held responsible for what the original traveler has done. 
(Schechtman, 2014, p. 36) 
 
There is thus a deep metaphysical fact about the identity between the dying Earthling and the 
would-be traveller, an irreducible subjectivity of the kind to which Ricoeur is committed, 
that reductionist connections are simply unable to capture, or so she contends 
(Schechtman, 2014, p. 34). 
 
I have pointed out above how the reductionist view can meet the intuition that the dying 
Earthling is the original and the Mars person a replica. What is at issue really is whether or 
not this identity is the deep metaphysical fact that Ricoeur and Schechtman think it is. I do 
not think the Teletransporter and its complications are meant to play a crucial role in 
Parﬁt’s case against this – that is the task of his Combined Spectrum and My Division, to 
which I will return below. However, I do think that considering the Tele-transporter and the 
Branch-Line Case in the light of Schechtman’s own view can lead us to further question the 
depth of the metaphysical fact about the unity of a person. 
 
Schechtman’s account of the deep unity is to be captured in her “Person Life View”. To be a 
person is to live a person life and you are the same person as long as this person life persists. 
We are to understand person life as a cluster concept, with three contributing continuities to the 
cluster. There are the psychological continuities of Parﬁt’s view, but there are also biological 
continuities highlighted by animalists like Olson, and there are the all-important social 
continuities that featured in her objections in the previous section. It is crucial to living a 
person life that others recognize you and  treat  you  as  the  same person: without this, you 
cannot “pick up the threads of  the  person  life”.  Being  a cluster concept, not all of the 
continuities need to be present in a particular case, although their interaction is the usual 
position. In the case of severe dementia, there will not be psychological continuity, but there 
will be continuity of organism  and  there  will  be social continuity in the way that family 
members will still care for the person and continue in many ways to treat them as the person 
they knew and loved. Their person life will continue. In the case of a cerebrum transplant, we 
would not have organism continuity, but would have psychological continuity and should 
there be social continuity as well – the cerebrum recipient is seen and treated as the donor – 
they would pick up the threads of the person life and would survive. Deep unity is thus 
retained. 
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On the Person Life View, because there are all three continuities between the dying 
Earthling and the person who entered the booth, the person life would continue there, 
following our intuitions about the identity of those involved. But now consider a society like 
that envisaged originally in Parﬁt’s teletransportation, where teletransportation is common 
and is viewed by the society as a normal form of travel.9 Those using it are viewed as 
travellers and so person lives are continued through it. Because there are both 
psychological and social continuities, that is enough for survival according to the theory, 
even though biological continuity is absent. Add to the example that accidents become 
relatively common with the cheaper companies offering the service, and society copes with 
that – relatives care for the dying Earthlings during their last few days, but do not change 
their views about the travellers. Relationships are tricky for those few days, but the 
damaged Earthlings never take more than a few days to go. The threads of person lives are 
thus picked up by the Mars people – the would-be travellers’ lives that is, and perhaps to 
some extent those of the dying Earthlings. But what then has happened to the deep 
metaphysical fact? There does not appear to be any difference between the situation of a 
dying Earthling here and the one in the original Branch-Line Case: even the extrinsic 
features that Schechtman insists make the difference that Parﬁt did not acknowledge in 
his My Division argument are in place. What must be in question is the depth of the 
unity, even following the Person Life View. Of course, that does not commit Ricoeur to 
acknowledging any difﬁculty – but it remains true that nothing he says about the 
phenomenon of mineness is missing in the case, other than its supposedly irreducible unity. 
 
7. Transplants and Decidability 
Another type of thought experiment that is not obviously undecidable, and which is not 
treated by those who make use of it as being so, is the transplant one like that of Locke. 
Ricoeur places them with the others. The prince and the cobbler, he says, is “imperfectly 
described”. Locke responds to the scenario that the prince survives in the cobbler’s body, 
but that is because he glosses over some crucial details which make the case undecidable: 
 
It is not in Locke but in his successors that the situation created by the hypothesis of 
transplanting one and the same soul into another body began to appear more undetermined 
rather than simply paradoxical, that is, contrary to common sense. For how could the 
prince’s memory not affect the cobbler’s body, his voice, his gestures, and his poses? And 
how could one situate the expression of the habitual character of the cobbler in relation to 
that of the prince’s memory? What has become problematic after Locke, and which was not 
so for him, is the possibility of distinguishing between two criteria of identity: the identity 
termed mental and that termed corporeal, as though the expression of memory were not 
itself a bodily phenomenon. (Ricoeur, 1992, p. 126 n14) 
 
The point of the prince and the cobbler, as well as most transplant thought experiments, is to 
separate usually concomitant psychological and physical continuity, in an attempt to show 
that physical continuity is not a requirement for personal identity. As the quote suggests, 
                                                          
9 The example comes from my 2015 paper, where I present a more detailed response to Schechtman’s arguments that the reductionist 
Psychological View cannot account for the special concern we have for our future selves. 
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Ricoeur thinks the very attempt to separate them is mired in inconceivability: the 
relationship between the mental and the corporeal is too complex to be severed. 
 
Ricoeur is, of course, correct that the mental and the corporeal are complexly related. His 
acknowledgement of the insights of Ryle is a reminder not only of the importance of 
dispositions in understanding the mind, but also that those are dispositions to physical 
behaviour. The meaning of much mental talk simply cannot be separated from talk 
about physical behaviour. However, that does not mean that those mental phenomena and 
that behaviour are the same thing. In talking about the mental, we are talking about 
what lies behind the behaviour, regardless of Ryle and Wittgenstein’s dismissal of the place 
of inner processes. And that emerges in Ricoeur’s own words: the expression of memory is 
indeed a bodily phenomenon, but that does not mean that memory is one. Add to this the 
thought that it is not only analytic philosophers who think that there may be room to 
separate mental from physical continuity. A vast number of people across cultures and times 
have thought that they could conceive of such a thing, and Locke points to such religious 
beliefs as illustrating the same idea as his ﬁction.1010 An account of the meaning of mind 
talk needs to accommodate this, and in doing so makes space for the separation of the two 
criteria. Memory may need to be expressed through the body, but that does not make it a 
requirement that it be this body. 
 
But does Ricoeur not have a point that memories need to be expressed in habitual ways – 
that mental happenings are only recognized as mine because of the way that I express 
them in behaviour recognizable as mine?  This  suggests  that  the  cobbler body could not 
express the prince’s thoughts, as it does not  have the  behavioural marks of the prince’s 
character. That seems to be a red herring, however, and one that is standardly avoided  
in thought-experiment literature.11 By making the donor and the recipient of the 
consciousness very similar – Parﬁt uses identical twins in one case and an exactly similar 
body in another – the problem is  anything  but obvious. If Locke had presented the  case 
of the Cobbler and the Cobbler’s Twin, Ricoeur’s complaint would have no traction. 
 
8. Reduplication and Decidability 
Ricoeur also highlights Parﬁt’s My Division thought experiment as an instance of 
undecidability. Here there are clearer grounds for the claim – Parﬁt draws his conclusion 
that “identity is not what matters” from his thinking that the question of identity in this 
case is an empty one. Ricoeur sees a familiar pattern: Parﬁt confuses idem and ipse again, 
sameness and selfhood, thereby producing a “paradox of sameness”. For Parﬁt to reach his 
conclusion 
 
it was necessary to maintain as equivalent the question Am I going to survive? and the question 
Will there be a person who will be the same person as I? (Ricoeur, 1992, p. 136) 
 
                                                          
10 “And thus we may be able without any difficulty to conceive, the same Person at the Resurrection, though in a Body not exactly in 
make or parts the same which he had here” (Locke, 1975, p. 340). 
11 Cf. the sensible discussion in Williams (1970, pp. 161–63). 
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In the ensuing ﬁction, Parﬁt inevitably violates the corporeal condition. Once again, 
though, I do not think his concerns hit their target. That is primarily because the case is 
not undecidable in such a way that it violates the condition: that is, that the person concerned 
does not know if they will survive. They do know that: the resulting people will have full 
selfhood complete with “the feeling of belonging – of memories in particular – to someone 
capable of designating himself or herself as their owner” (1992: 136). They will both have the 
primitive certainty of being the same self, though this may be shaken when they meet each 
other. They will survive, but they will not survive uniquely. Both of them will see 
experiences and body up to the time of ﬁssion as mine. They will both feel, and will both 
be, responsible for pre-ﬁssion behaviour. What is undecidable is which one the original 
divider will be, if they must be one, because neither has any claim that the other does 
not share. Thus Parﬁt’s argument that we cannot use the term “identity” because that 
implies uniqueness, despite the presence of everything that can matter in survival. 
 
The question of selfhood has not been eliminated, unless one demands that selfhood implies 
uniqueness in the way that the term identity does – and that there can be only one 
individual who can designate themselves as the owner of an earlier experience. But that is 
precisely the assumption to which Parﬁt is presenting a reductio ad absurdum. On the 
assumption that mineness is factually unique, then one of the survivors will have it and 
the other will not, despite there being no other difference between them. The other 
being’s sense of self towards the pre-ﬁssion individual will be just as strong and will feel 
just the same, yet will somehow be false and mistaken. But that is hard to swallow, and this 
is what Parﬁt is highlighting. It is not a violation of the criterion of corporeality but a reductio 
of it, or at least this aspect of it. 
 
9. Concluding 
Although many of my points have been negative ones since they arise in defence of a 
theory, I think that there are a number of positives that emerge from this contact 
between two very different views and traditions. One is that Ricoeur’s understanding of 
what a person is is an insightful and important one, and one which the analytic discussion can 
learn from. Experiences and bodies belong to someone, and it must be to “someone capable 
of designating himself or herself as the one whose body (or experience) it is”. This helps to 
capture the importance of agency to self or personhood. Agency should be highlighted in a 
way that Parﬁt’s version of the PCT does not do, but which is easily done given the 
psychological resources which are the focus of the PCT. A person must be something 
capable of being the appropriate subject of moral judgments and attitudes of self-concern. It 
is the persistence of such a thing that a theory of personal identity must account for. 
 
We also can learn that moral identity and personal identity, although related, should not be 
seen as coinciding. I presented this as one version of the PCT at the start, but it is not 
universally held by psychological theorists, and the theory improves by including it. 
Ricoeur’s argument that the requirements of morality mean that I must know that past 
experiences were and future experiences will be mine is too strong. It does not have to be 
the case that I must know past experiences to be mine for them to be mine, nor that they 
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are not mine if this is not the case. Morality only requires of agents that they are the sorts 
of things capable of seeing experiences as their own. The difﬁculties of the demand for 
mineness start emerging in the examples discussed above, especially with regard to My 
Division. And they are also evident elsewhere. There can be many actions of yours for 
which you are not responsible – non-autonomous ones being the most obvious. 
Pathological cases provide graphic illustrations of the gap. People who suffer from 
thought-insertion have the experience as if others are using their minds – someone else’s 
thoughts occur in their mind (Mullins and Spence, 2003). These thoughts have no place in 
their sense of self: exactly what they lack is the feature of mineness. But they are their 
thoughts, nevertheless, no matter how alien they feel. The sense of self that the narrative 
theory makes central is crucial in being a person – you have to have one to be a person – but it 
is not a good guide to the limits or identity of the person. 
 
Schechtman gets closer to getting things right in her new theory in Staying Alive. She gives up 
the link between moral identity and personal identity that dominated her earlier views, but 
she retains too strong a reliance on the notion of mineness and its uniqueness, to the 
detriment of her theory. But that is a story for another day 12 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
12 I have gestured at that story here, and do so in more detail in Beck (2015). 
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